GeoMemo
MON, JUN 29 · EDT
CountriesSudanOperational risk · 90 days
Operational risk · 90-day outlookLast updated 2026-06-21 · 8 days ago · stale

Sudan

An enterprise-decision view of Sudan’s operational risk over the next 90 days. Scenario probabilities, sanctions exposure, chokepoints, and political outlook — for risk officers, supply chain teams, and analysts who need to act, not just read.

Stability score?Stability scoreWeighted composite of seven pillars (conflict, events, arms, economy, market, sanctions, humanitarian). Higher = healthier. Recomputed daily. Lower = greater operational risk.
41.1
Critical risk
Headline signal · 90-day event volume
Sudan · annotated 90-day event volume
2,159
total events · 90 daily data points
Annotated milestones
1 of 20
REFUGEE FLOW2026-04-012026-05-162026-06-29
Source · intelligence_events · all severity tiersHover any annotated dot for full milestone
Risk matrix · five dimensions
Political
41Moderate
Security
67Elevated
Economic
45Moderate
Regulatory
25Moderate
Operational
38Moderate
Risk dimensions are derived from the 7 stability pillars. Higher score = more risk (inverted from the stability score, where higher = healthier). Operational is a weighted composite intended for enterprise-decision use.
Scenario probabilities · next 90 days
01
Humanitarian collapse accelerates with concurrent siege intensification and mass displacement surge

The humanitarian collapse is already underway with 89% Bayesian confidence. The convergence of prolonged siege conditions, food insecurity affecting 19.5 million, and UN warnings of imminent ground offensive on El Obeid suggests further deterioration in the 90-day window. Documented war crimes and sexual violence indicate no de-escalation pathway, only deepening crisis.

Indicators · what would confirm
  • El Fasher siege duration now 18+ months with no relief corridor established
  • 19.5 million facing acute food insecurity as of June 2026
  • 13-14 million internally displaced with 4+ million cross-border refugees
  • UN Security Council warning of imminent ground offensive on El Obeid (June 2026)
  • Systematic sexual violence documented by UNICEF as ongoing tactic
89%
probability
critical impact
02
Ground offensive on El Obeid city triggers secondary displacement wave and regional destabilization

UN intelligence assessments explicitly warned of imminent ground offensive on El Obeid in mid-June 2026, and the Kordofan region faces concurrent humanitarian disaster declarations. El Obeid sits as strategic waypoint between SAF-controlled areas and RSF strongholds. A 90-day window beginning late June positions this offensive as highly probable, with potential to displace 500K+ additional persons and trigger refugee surges into neighboring states.

Indicators · what would confirm
  • UN Security Council specific warning of imminent ground offensive on El Obeid (June 2026)
  • Kordofan region designated humanitarian disaster zone by UN
  • El Obeid residents already facing severe hardship and lack of essential services
  • RSF demonstrated siege capability in El Fasher over 18 months
  • Military-RSF conflict shows no signs of negotiated settlement
78%
probability
critical impact
03
International sanctions expansion targeting RSF leadership and military-aligned figures accelerates capital flight

Sanctions regimes targeting RSF leadership hardened significantly in May-June 2026 with coordinated multilateral action. The designation velocity and scope indicate sustained international commitment to financial isolation of conflict actors. Within 90 days, secondary sanctions targeting financial intermediaries and regional facilitators are likely, further constraining conflict financing and potentially triggering negotiation pressure-though historical precedent suggests leadership adaptation rather than compliance.

Indicators · what would confirm
  • Al-Goney Hamdan Dagalo (RSF deputy) multi-layered sanctions added May-June 2026 (UN, EU, US, Swiss, Russian)
  • Recent US 7031(c) designations targeting gross human rights violations (June 2026)
  • Coordinated EU/UN Sudan sanctions regime 1591 actively enforced
  • No evidence of sanctions relief negotiations or sanctions-for-ceasefire dialogue
  • Rapid expansion suggests donor consensus on culpability for atrocities
72%
probability
high impact
04
Regional refugee destabilization spreads to Egypt, South Sudan, and Ethiopia with secondary conflicts triggered

The 4+ million cross-border refugee flow has already created secondary instability in host nations. UK's expansion of North Africa migration programming and international focus on preventing onward migration to Europe suggest recognition of sustained refugee pressure. Within 90 days, resource scarcity in host states (particularly Egypt) and intra-refugee community tensions could trigger secondary conflicts or forced repatriation attempts, complicating regional stability further.

Indicators · what would confirm
  • 4+ million refugees already across Sudan borders (Ethiopia, Egypt, South Sudan, Chad)
  • UK expanding North Africa migration programme with £9M additional funding (June 2026)
  • Whalesbook data citing 15 million displaced returns globally creating infrastructure deficits
  • Documented sexual violence and trauma among displaced populations
  • Regional host states (Egypt, Ethiopia) facing economic strain from refugee absorption
65%
probability
high impact
05
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan pursue alternative defense partnerships, isolating Sudan from arms access and increasing military asymmetry

The Saudi withdrawal of Pakistan's Sudan arms deal in April 2026 signals declining regional support for conflict combatants and represents a strategic pivot away from Sudan militarization. Within 90 days, this military isolation may incentivize ceasefire negotiations if combined with sustained sanctions pressure, or alternatively may entrench RSF non-state logistics networks. The asymmetry favors non-state actors with distributed supply chains over conventional SAF procurement.

Indicators · what would confirm
  • Saudi Arabia withdrew $1.5B Pakistan arms deal for Sudan (April 2026)
  • Pakistan's Africa defense expansion strategy derailed by Saudi intervention
  • No evidence of alternative arms suppliers replacing lost Pakistani route
  • RSF continued siege operations suggest non-state capability sufficiency
  • International military support restrictions on all Sudan factions
58%
probability
moderate impact
Watchlist · next 90 days
01
El Obeid ground offensive execution and scale of displacement cascade
Indicator · UN OCHA situational reports on military movements toward El Obeid; cross-border refugee registration surge in South Sudan/Chad; satellite imagery of military concentration
78%
02
Humanitarian access corridors status and aid delivery capacity in Kordofan and Darfur regions
Indicator · WFP convoy approvals; UNOCHA access reports; health facility operational status; food security assessments in siege zones
85%
03
RSF and SAF leadership response to expanded multilateral sanctions and secondary sanctions targeting financial networks
Indicator · Central Bank of Sudan policy shifts; currency volatility; asset seizure announcements; negotiation signals or hardline rhetoric
72%
04
Regional host state (Egypt, Ethiopia) capacity thresholds and refugee policy reversals
Indicator · Host government border closures or restrictions; UNHCR burden-sharing assessments; domestic political pressure in host states; repatriation announcements
68%
05
Sexual violence and war crimes documentation and accountability mechanisms activation
Indicator · ICC investigation progress; witness testimony collection; NGO atrocity documentation reports; UN Commission of Inquiry updates
61%
06
Third-country military or diplomatic intervention signals (Saudi, Egypt, UAE, Eritrea, or external actors)
Indicator · Military deployments near borders; diplomatic summits; proxy funding flows; public statements of concern or support
55%
Political outlook · 90-day judgments
Fractured state authority with no viable governance transition pathway; military-RSF competition for territorial control and resource access driving perpetual conflict.

Sudan's political system has effectively collapsed into a two-actor civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) with no functional central authority, parliament, or transitional governance mechanisms. Leadership succession risk is acute: SAF command structure remains personalized around military hierarchy, while RSF maintains centralized control under Hamdan Dagalo (now heavily sanctioned). Neither actor demonstrates willingness to negotiate power-sharing or constitutional settlement. The conflict has become self-sustaining through control of territory, resource extraction (gold, minerals), and predatory taxation of displaced populations. International isolation-through coordinated sanctions, military aid restrictions, and diplomatic estrangement-has hardened rather than softened negotiating positions, suggesting entrenchment for the 90-day horizon and beyond.

high confidence
Sanctions exposure
Sanctioned entities tied to Sudan
127
Multilateral sanctions regimes targeting RSF and SAF figures hardening; coordinated US, EU, UN, Swiss, and Russian action indicates sustained pressure with low reversal probability.
Active regimes
UN Security Council Resolution 1591 (2005) Sudan sanctions regime - active with April-May 2026 expansionsEU Sudan sanctions (regulation 747/2014) - active with May-June 2026 designationsUS OFAC Sudan sanctions program - active with June 2026 human rights designations under Section 7031(c)Swiss Ordinance 946.231.18 on Sudan measures - active with April-May 2026 updatesRussian RSFSR sanctions regime - active with May 2026 coordination
Recent changes
Al-Goney Hamdan Dagalo (RSF deputy) designated under multiple regimes May-June 2026 (UN, EU, US, Swiss, Russian)
Abdul Rahim Hamdan Dagalo designated EU SDN 2026/531 (March 2026)
Saleh Salah Abdalla Mohamed Mohamed Salih designated US 7031(c) human rights violations (June 2026)
Awatif Ahmed Seed Ahmed Mohamed (spouse of Salih) designated US 7031(c) (June 2026)
Abu Nashuk, Al Zeir Salem, AL-FATEH Abdullah Idris designated EU SDN 2026/531 (March 2026)
Outlook ·Sanctions architecture will likely expand in the 90-day window to target secondary financial facilitators, regional intermediaries, and commercial entities linked to gold smuggling and conflict financing. No off-ramp or sanctions-for-ceasefire dialogue is evident, suggesting sustained or escalatory sanctions through Q3 2026. RSF adaptation through informal networks and regional partner support (Central African Republic, Libya) may reduce sanctions bite but will not reverse designations. Probability of sanctions relief in next 90 days remains below 0.15.
Trade chokepoints
Red Sea - Sudanese ports (Port Sudan, Suakin) - Egypt trade corridor
Cereals, petroleum products, manufactured goods
Exposure
72%
Disruption
71%
Khartoum - El Fasher inland corridor (Darfur region)
Food aid, medical supplies, humanitarian goods
Exposure
85%
Disruption
89%
Sudan - South Sudan southern border (Upper Nile region)
Oil (pipeline transit), cereals, trade goods
Exposure
58%
Disruption
68%
Active conflicts involving Sudan
Iran warEscalation 100
Persian Gulf conflictEscalation 100
West Asia conflictEscalation 100
Boko Haram insurgencyEscalation 100
Sudan civil warEscalation 100
Darfur conflictEscalation 48.8
+Glossary & methodology

Operational risk here means the practical exposure that a business, government, or institution operating in or around Sudan would face. We model five dimensions (Political / Security / Economic / Regulatory / Operational) using a weighted blend of seven underlying pillars.

Scenarios are generated daily under ICD 203 analytic-tradecraft standards. Each scenario carries a calibrated probability, named indicators that would confirm or deny it, and impact across regulatory / kinetic / economic axes.

This page is the deeper-read companion to the Sudan country page for risk officers and operators. The country page covers daily news, judgments, and watchlist; this page covers 90-day strategic outlook.

← Back to Sudan daily brief