Intelligence · Dashboard
Global risk & conflict monitor.
A quantitative cross-section of 479 tracked conflicts, 81,616 strategic events (30d), 362 arms transfers, 71,221 sanctioned entities, and 10 Bayesian threat indices. Ingested every 3 hours.
Active Conflicts?What this KPI meansActive conflicts — conflicts we are currently tracking with the status
How we count: row count from the
active, escalating, or ongoing.How we count: row count from the
strategic_conflicts table, filtered by status. The sparkline will fill once we track active-count history (not yet recorded daily).347
of 479 tracked
Strategic Events · 30d?What this KPI meansStrategic events — LLM-extracted, scored events of geopolitical significance (air strikes, troop deployments, assassinations, cyber attacks, arms sales, diplomatic pacts…).
How we count: rows in
How we count: rows in
strategic_events with event_date ≥ today − 30 days. Arrow = 14-day trajectory (first-half mean vs second-half mean). “High-σ” = significance score ≥ 80.81,616
13,971 in last 7d · 3,212 high-σ
Arms Transfers · 30d?What this KPI meansArms transfers— announced, delivered, or contracted weapons & defense transfers: missiles, aircraft, armored vehicles, drones, ammunition, and the like.
How we count: rows in
How we count: rows in
strategic_transfers with announced_date ≥ today − 30 days. Arrow = 14-day trajectory.362
4 in last 7d
Sanctions Δ · 30d?What this KPI meansSanctions delta — persons, organizations, and companies newly added to any tracked sanctions list in the last 30 days (OFAC, EU, UK, UN, national lists).
How we count:
How we count:
SUM(added_count) from sanctions_daily_deltas over the window. Arrow = 14-day additions trajectory.+1,204
71,221 entities total
σ Anomalies?What this KPI meansσ anomalies — how many of our tracked Bayesian threats are running unusually hot or cold vs. their own recent baseline.
How we count: threats where
How we count: threats where
|current_probability − prior_probability| ≥ 0.10. When the count spikes, many threats are moving at once — a signal that the global situation is changing, not just one region.3
of 10 threats
Top Risk Countries · 30d trajectorystability 0–100 · lower = less stable
0133.0 /100Critical0234.8 /100Critical0335.5 /100Critical0435.8 /100Critical0537.7 /100Critical0638.8 /100Critical0740.0 /100Critical0842.0 /100Critical0942.6 /100Critical1043.2 /100CriticalActive ConflictsGeoMemo Intel · top 6
Iran war100 / Crit
war · active
Persian Gulf conflict100 / Crit
maritime · active
Middle East conflict100 / Crit
civil_war · active
Mexico drug cartel violence100 / Crit
civil_war · active
West Asia conflict100 / Crit
civil_war · active
Strait of Hormuz crisis100 / Crit
maritime · active
Arms Transfers · last 30 days362 · top 6 recent
Ewoyaa Lithium Project$71M
AU → CN · Elevra Lithium · May 11 · announced
Elevra Lithium sold its 50% stake in Ghana's Ewoyaa lithium project to Chinese company Huayou Cobalt for US$71 million, strategically exiting African joint venture complexity while reflecting broader geopolitical realignment dividing global lithium markets between Chinese and Western processing capacity.
Source: Discovery Alert — Elevra Lithium’s $71M Ewoyaa Sale to Huayou Explained
Nvidia AI servers$2.5B
US → CN · Nvidia · May 8 · proposed
Thai company OBON Corp was identified as a key intermediary in a $2.5 billion scheme allegedly diverting restricted Nvidia AI servers through Thailand to China, potentially disrupting GPU supply chains and raising export control concerns.
Source: CryptoRank — Thai’s OBON Corp named in US smuggling probe as Nvidia’s chips flow to Chinese buyers
used Japanese destroyers
JP → PH · Maritime Self-Defense Force · May 7 · proposed
Japan and the Philippines established a defense framework on May 7, 2026, to export used destroyers, marking Japan's first lethal weapons sale under revised April 2026 policy, strengthening Philippine naval capabilities against Chinese military expansion in the South China Sea.
Source: Meyka — Japan-Philippines Defense Deal May 7: Destroyer Export Framework Agreed
Kızılelma
TR → ID · Baykar · May 6 · contracted
Indonesia signed a historic deal to purchase twelve of Turkey's Kızılelma unmanned fighter jets, marking the aircraft's first export contract, with deliveries commencing in 2028 and provisions for forty-eight additional units.
Source: EurAsian Times — World's First Unmanned Fighter: Indonesia Signs Historic Export Deal for Turkey's Kızılelma UCAV
cyber_system
FR → AM · French Ministry of Defense · May 5 · proposed
Armenia and France signed a strategic partnership declaration covering defense, cybersecurity, and infrastructure development.
Source: Azat TV — Armenia and France Formalize Strategic Partnership Agreement
ai_system
FR → AM · French Ministry of Defense · May 5 · proposed
Armenia and France signed a strategic partnership declaration covering defense, cybersecurity, and infrastructure development.
Source: Azat TV — Armenia and France Formalize Strategic Partnership Agreement
Sanctions Activity · last 30 days+1204 added · 71,221 total
EISIadded
Organization · RU · May 12
EISI
Organization · RU · snapshot May 12
Sanctions programs: "The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 - The Secretary of State considers there are reasonable grounds to suspect that EXPERT INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH (hereafter 'EISI') is an 'involved person' under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 on the basis of the following grounds: 1) EISI is and has been involved in obtaining a benefit from or supporting the Government of Russia by carrying on business as a Government of Russia-affiliated entity by being owned or controlled by the Government of Russia · and 2) EISI is and has been involved in destabilising Ukraine by being responsible for, engaging in, providing support for, or promoting any policy or action which destabilises Ukraine or undermines or threatens the territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence of Ukraine. - The Secretary of State considers there are reasonable grounds to suspect that EXPERT INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH (hereafter âEISIâ) is an âinvolved personâ under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 on the basis of the following grounds: 1) EISI is and has been involved in obtaining a benefit from or supporting the Government of Russia by carrying on business as a Government of Russia-affiliated entity by being owned or controlled by the Government of Russia · and 2) EISI is and has been involved in destabilising Ukraine by being responsible for, engaging in, providing support for, or promoting any policy or action which destabilises Ukraine or undermines or threatens the territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence of Ukraine. - 2026-05-11"
Source: OpenSanctions · GB
TSISMadded
Organization · RU · May 12
TSISM
Organization · RU · snapshot May 12
Sanctions programs: "The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 - The Secretary of State considers there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the Centre for the Study of the Youth Environment and Monitoring of Networks (hereafter âCISMâ) is an â
involved
personâ under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 on the basis of the following grounds: 1) CISM is and has been involved in destabilising Ukraine by being responsible for, engaging in, providing support for, or promoting any policy or action which destabilises Ukraine or undermines or threatens the territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence of Ukraine · and 2) CISM is and has been involved in obtaining a benefit from or supporting the Government of Russia by carrying on business as a Government of Russia-affiliated entity by being owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the Government of Russia. - The Secretary of State considers there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the Centre for the Study of the Youth Environment and Monitoring of Networks (hereafter 'CISM') is an ' involved person' under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 on the basis of the following grounds: 1) CISM is and has been involved in destabilising Ukraine by being responsible for, engaging in, providing support for, or promoting any policy or action which destabilises Ukraine or undermines or threatens the territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence of Ukraine · and 2) CISM is and has been involved in obtaining a benefit from or supporting the Government of Russia by carrying on business as a Government of Russia-affiliated entity by being owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the Government of Russia. - 2026-05-11"
Source: OpenSanctions · GB
Nihat Abdul Kadir ASANadded
Person · IR · May 12
Nihat Abdul Kadir ASAN
Person · IR · snapshot May 12
Sanctions programs: "The Iran (Sanctions) Regulations 2023 - The Secretary of State considers that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that Nihat Abdul Kadir ASAN is an involved person under The Iran (Sanctions) Regulations 2023 on the basis of the following grounds: (1) ASAN is or has been involved in hostile activity by the Government of Iran by threatening, planning or conducting attacks against persons and assets in the United Kingdom or any other country · and (2) ASAN is or has been involved in hostile activity by the Government of Iran by conduct which facilitates (or is intended to facilitate) or gives support or assistance to the same - 2026-05-11"
Source: OpenSanctions · GB
Namik SALIFOVadded
Person · AZ · May 12
Namik SALIFOV
Person · AZ · snapshot May 12
Sanctions programs: "The Iran (Sanctions) Regulations 2023 - The Secretary of State considers that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that Namiq SALIFOV is an involved person under The Iran (Sanctions) Regulations 2023 on the basis of the following grounds: (1) SALIFOV is or has been involved in hostile activity by the Government of Iran by threatening, planning or conducting attacks against persons and assets in the United Kingdom or any other country · and (2) SALIFOV is or has been involved in hostile activity by the Government of Iran by conduct which facilitates (or is intended to facilitate) or gives support or assistance to the same. - 2026-05-11"
Source: OpenSanctions · GB
Ekrem Abdulkerym OZTUNCadded
Person · TR · May 12
Ekrem Abdulkerym OZTUNC
Person · TR · snapshot May 12
Sanctions programs: "The Iran (Sanctions) Regulations 2023 - The Secretary of State considers that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that Ekrem OZTUNC is an involved person under The Iran (Sanctions) Regulations 2023 on the basis of the following grounds:(1) OZTUNC is or has been involved in hostile activity by the Government of Iran by threatening, planning or conducting attacks against persons and assets in the United Kingdom or any other country · and (2) OZTUNC is associated with a person who is or has been involved in hostile activity by the Government of Iran, as he is the nephew of Naji Sharifi Zindashti. - 2026-05-11"
Source: OpenSanctions · GB
Live Events Feed · last 7 days13,971 events · top 14 by significance
MAY 13, 2026σ 95KPcyber_attack
Lazarus Group performed the WannaCry ransomware attack, targeting computers running Windows
MAY 13, 2026σ 95US → IRassassination
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed in the attacks.
MAY 5, 2026σ 90GB → USconflict_escalation
The British imposed a total blockade on the colonies.
MAY 12, 2026σ 90COassassination
A presidential candidate was shot in the head during a rally in the capital, Bogota, and later died from his injuries.
MAY 13, 2026σ 90KPnuclear_test
North Korea tested its first nuclear weapon five years after quitting the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
MAY 13, 2026σ 90UA → RUdrone_strike
Ukrainian pilots remotely guided explosive drones to destroy Russian warplanes.
MAY 13, 2026σ 90JP → RUnaval_operation
The Japanese fleet led by Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō defeated the Russian fleet under Admiral Zinovi Petróvich Rozhéstvenski in the Battle of Tsushima.
MAY 13, 2026σ 90IL → IRair_strike
Israel launched airstrikes on Iran on February 28.
MAY 13, 2026σ 90US → IRair_strike
The United States launched airstrikes on Iran on February 28.
MAY 12, 2026σ 90IRnuclear_test
Iran warned it could consider enriching uranium to 90 percent purity if attacked again.
MAY 12, 2026σ 80IR → BBnaval_operation
Iran seizes Barbados-flagged tanker 'Ocean Koi'
MAY 12, 2026σ 80SOconflict_escalation
Intensified counterterrorism operations led to substantial militant casualties in the Horn of Africa region.
MAY 12, 2026σ 80IR → USmissile_test
Iranian forces retaliated against US attack by targeting American units near the Strait of Hormuz
MAY 12, 2026σ 80IR → IQdrone_strike
Drone and rocket attacks targeted American, British and other Western-linked facilities in Iraq.